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COMPARABLE WORTH AND THE LIMITATIONS OF THE
BENNETT AMENDMENT
L U.E v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3948 (U.S.
June 22, 1981) (No. 80-781).
Both the Equal Pay Act of 1963' and Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 19642 purport to eradicate sex-based wage discrimination. The
Equal Pay Act prohibits unequal pay for women who perform work
equal to that of men.3 Title VII prohibits compensation discrimination
and other forms of employment discrimination on the basis of sex as
well as on the basis of race, color, religion or national origin.4 How-
ever, despite the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, many women continue
to receive less than their equal share of earnings. The relation of wo-
men's median earnings to men's median earnings is virtually the same
today as it was in 1939, before the passage of any federal legislation
against wage discrimination. 5 Equal compensation for women seems
as far away now as it ever did.
A major reason for the lack of women's economic progress has
been that courts have limited application of equal pay legislation to
cases in which women's jobs were substantially the same as men's jobs.
1. Pub. L. No. 88-38, § i, 77 Stat. 56 (1963), amending the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
§§ I, 6(d), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, 206(d) (1976).
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1976).
3. The Equal Pay Act forbids an employer from discriminating:
on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees. . . at a rate less than the rate at which
he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex . . . for equal work in jobs the perform-
ance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed
under similar working conditions.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
4. Title VII provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportu-
nities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
5. In 1939 the median earnings of full time women workers were 58% of the median earn-
ings of men. In 1977 their median earnings had risen to 59% of the median earnings of men.
WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: SOME NEW DATA SERIES, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics 6-7 (1.979) [hereinafter referred to as Bureau of Labor Statistics].
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Even for plaintiffs bringing claims under the broad anti-discrimination
provisions of Title VII, courts have insisted that the equal work stan-
dard6 of the Equal Pay Act be met. Since most working women still
hold the traditionally female jobs of nurse, teacher, secretary and do-
mestic worker,7 their earnings have been unaffected by federal legisla-
tion. The jobs of these women continue to be undervalued and
undercompensated because there has been no way to claim equality
with traditionally male jobs.
The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in I U.E. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 8 was a departure from
the usual judicial interpretations9 of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII.
In I. U.E. the Third Circuit allowed a sex-based wage discrimination
claim to be brought under Title VII on the basis of allegations that the
plaintiffs performed work comparable to that of more highly compen-
sated males, rather than on allegations of equal work. The kind of
comparable work claimed by the I U.E. plaintiffs has also been re-
ferred to as "comparable worth,"' 0 because female plaintiffs in such
cases allege that their work is worth as much to their employers as is
the work of male employees.
An assertion of comparable worth does not depend upon similarity
of skill, effort, responsibility or working conditions. The . UE plain-
tiffs, individual women workers in Westinghouse's Trenton, New
Jersey plant and their union, the International Union of Electrical
Workers, conceded that men and women at the plant were not doing
the same work. However, they contended that Westinghouse intention-
ally set female jobs at a lower wage rate than male jobs even though the
6. The equal work standard requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, as well as per-
formance under similar working conditions. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976). See note 3 supra.
7. Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 6, at 6-7.
8. 631 F.2d 1094 (3d Cir. 1980),petitionfor cert.filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3410 (U.S. Nov. 14, 1980)
(No. 80-781).
9. See, e.g., Orr v. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865
(1975); Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d
259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 705 (1970).
10. A claim of "comparable work" refers to the comparison of jobs which are similar, but
which cannot meet the "substantially equal" work standard of the Equal Pay Act. See Gunther v.
County of Washington, 623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979), afi'd 49 U.S.L.W. 4623 (June 8, 1981).
"Comparable worth" or "comparable work value," however, are broader terms referring to situa-
tions where the two jobs being assessed may be different in nature or content, yet provide the
employer with comparable value. Plaintiffs alleging either the larger category of "comparable
work" or the subdivision of that category, "comparable worth," rely upon being able to assert a
claim under Title VII without proving that the female jobs in question have "substantially equal"
skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions as the male jobs receiving a higher wage.
Although the L UE. court refers to "comparable work," UE. v. Westinghouse has also been
referred to as a case involving a claim of "comparable worth." See Brown, The "Comparable
Work" Issue-A Title VII Pandora's Box?, NAT'L L.J., July 28, 1980, at 27, col. 1.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
female and male jobs had been given similar evaluation points. II The
individual women plaintiffs asserted that since their jobs were as valua-
ble to Westinghouse as men's jobs, they should receive equal pay even
though they had not made a showing of equal work. The Third Circuit
concluded that an allegation of comparable worth was sufficient for the
plaintiffs to state a claim against Westinghouse.
Although the I UE decision is in keeping with the anti-discrimi-
nation spirit of the Civil Rights Act, the court's analysis was unsatisfac-
tory. This comment will evaluate the I U.E decision in several ways.
It will first review the legislative history behind the Equal Pay Act and
Title VII and then discuss the traditional judicial interpretations of
these statutes. Next, the facts and reasoning of!. U.E. will be presented
and analyzed in light of statutory language, legislative history, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission 12 guidelines on sex discrimina-
tion and relevant case law. Finally, the comment will evaluate policy
considerations and likely repercussions of the decision.
THE EQUAL PAY ACT
The first implementation of equal pay for women occurred during
World War II when the War Labor Board' 3 decided cases in which
women claimed that they had been unfairly compensated.' 4 After
World War II there were equal pay bills introduced in every Con-
gress'5 until finally, in 1963, the Equal Pay Act was passed as an
amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.16 Although most
of the previous bills proposed equal pay for comparable work, 17 the
1I. Plaintiffs alleged that Westinghouse's wage structure was based on a system which had
been established in the 1930s and which assigned all jobs points for training, knowledge, and
responsibility, even though jobs were segregated by sex. 631 F.2d at 1097.
12. Hereinafter referred to in text and notes as the EEOC.
13. The National War Labor Board was established so that there would be industrial stability
during World War II. The National War Labor Board heard disputes between management and
labor, including wage disputes. See Gitt & Gelb, Beyond the Equal Pay Act. Expanding Wage
Differential Protection Under Title VII, 8 Loy. CHi. L.J. 723, 735 (1972).
14. Interestingly enough in light of the L UE. decision, the National War Labor Board enter-
tained claims involving comparable worth as well as claims involving equal work. In General
Elec. Co. and Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 28 War Labor Reports 666 (1945), the National War
Labor Board granted relief on a claim of comparable worth. The women employees in that case,
like plaintiffs in . U.E, claimed that the point evaluation system which should have compensated
them equally with male employees receiving similar evaluations did not achieve that result.
15. See S. 1178, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945); S. 1556, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); S. 706, 81st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); H.R. 3550, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); S. 176, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. (1953);
H.R. 7172, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); H.R. 59, 84th Cong., Ist Sess. (1955); H.R. 394, 85th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1957); S. 3926, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); S. 2494, 87th Cong., ist Sess. (1961).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, 206 (d) (1976).
17. All of the bills listed in note 15 supra contained the word "comparable." The only bill to
be seriously considered before 1963 was H.R. 8898, which was reported out of committee on May
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standard enacted under the Equal Pay Act was equal work. The Act
was directed at the limited situation of women being denied equal pay
when their jobs were virtually identical with those of men. Its goal was
to eliminate the employer practice of paying women only a fraction of
what was paid to men for doing the same job.' 8 Despite the rigid re-
quirements of the equal work standard, the Equal Pay Act was in-
tended to end sex-based wage discrimination. Its statement of purpose
recognizes that wage differentials based on sex hurt commerce, obstruct
employer-employee relations and depress living standards.' 9 The
Equal Pay Act forbids an employer from discriminating:
on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees . . . at a rate less
than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex
* . . for equal work in jobs the performance of which requires ejual
skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under simi-
lar working conditions.20
After a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of equal work, the
burden then shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the wage differ-
ential falls within one of the four exceptions listed at the end of the
Equal Pay Act. Pay differentials are allowed if they result from any of
the following: a seniority system, a merit system, a system which meas-
ures earnings by quantity or quality of production or a differential
based on any other factor than sex.21 These exceptions to the equal pay
for equal work standard may be used by an employer as affirmative
defenses to a plaintiff's claim of sex-based wage discrimination.
Although the Equal Pay Act sets out the definite criteria of equal
work, equal skill, equal responsibility and similarity of working condi-
17, 1962. This bill initially contained the word "comparable." However, during the Congres-
sional debates, Representative St. George moved to amend the bill by substituting the word
"equal" for "comparable," arguing that "comparable" was an overbroad concept. 108 CONG.
REC. 14,768-70 (1962).
After much debate the House passed the bill with the word "equal" rather than the word
"comparable." Supporters of women's rights expressed belief that the bill would solve the
problems of sex discrimination. James B. Carey, Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO Industrial
Union Department, felt confident that the concept of equal pay for equal work would solve the
problems of sex discrimination. Carey said unequal pay takes three forms: (1) paying lower
wages to women for doing work equal to that of men; (2) introducing small changes into men's
jobs and then compensating them at a much higher rate; (3) undervaluing the skill and responsi-
bility of women regardless of men having similar jobs. Hearings on S. 7444 Before the Subcomm.
on Labor of the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Comm, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1963).
Although the bill was approved by the Senate, it passed only as an amendment to the Foreign
Service Buildings Act of 1926. The House then refused to accept the bill as a rider to another
piece of legislation. 108 CONG. REC. 23,013 (1962).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
19. Id. § 206(a).
20. Id. § 206(d)(I).
21. Id.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
tions, it has been left to the courts to determine what those criteria of
the equal work standard mean. In Corning Glass Works v. Brennan,22
the United States Supreme Court held that paying male night shift in-
spection workers a higher wage than female day shift inspection work-
ers was a violation of the Equal Pay Act. The Court determined that
meeting the equal work standard did not require showing that a wo-
man's job was identical to a man's job. The Court said that a plaintiff
need only show that the two jobs were "substantially equal," rather
than identical, in skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions.
The Court in Corning ruled that the two jobs at issue were "substan-
tially equal" since the time of day during which the two groups of em-
ployees worked did not constitute a sufficiently different working
condition to justify the employer's pay discrimination. 23 Thus the
Court held that the female employees should not be paid less than the
male employees.
Lower court decisions of claims brought under the Equal Pay Act
followed the Corning criteria. Although courts have looked beyond
nonessential elements of jobs, they have insisted that the plaintiff meet
the burden of showing that the female job in question was "substan-
tially equal" to the more highly compensated male job.24
TITLE VII AND THE BENNETT AMENDMENT
The goals of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are much
broader than the goals of the Equal Pay Act. Title VII has a general
proscription against discriminatory compensation 25 rather than a spe-
cific equal work standard. In addition, Title VII is concerned with dis-
crimination in hiring and discharging employees as well as with
discrimination in compensation and conditions of employment. It is
aimed at preventing segregation or classification that works to the det-
riment of a particular group, whether that group be identifiable by race,
color, religion, sex or national origin.26
The important question for a plaintiff claiming sex-based wage
22. 417 U.S. 188 (1974).
23. Id. at 203. Since the plaintiffs in Corning had met the burden of complying with the
equal work standard, it was then up to the employer to show that the wage differential was cov-
ered by one of the exceptions listed in the Equal Pay Act. The employer in Corning made no such
showing.
24. See EEOC v. Aetna Ins. Co., 616 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1980); Roesel v. Joliet Wrought
Washer Co., 596 F.2d 183 (7th Cir. 1979); Angelo v. Bacharach Instrument Co., 555 F.2d 1164 (3d
Cir. 1977); Brennan v. Prince William Hosp. Corp., 503 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1974); Shultz v. Whea-
ton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 705 (1970).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1976). See note 4 supra for relevant provisions of Title VII.
26. Id.
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discrimination is whether she can bring a discriminatory compensation
case under Title VII without having to satisfy the equal work standard
of the Equal Pay Act.27 The answer to this question depends upon an
analysis of the Bennett Amendment to Title VII.2 8 The Bennett
Amendment links the Equal Pay Act to Title VII. The extent of the
linkage is uncertain because of ambiguity in the language of the Ben-
nett Amendment. The amendment reads as follows:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this sub-
chapter for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in
determining the amount of the wages or compensation paid or to be
paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is author-
ized by the provisions of [the Equal Pay Act]. 29
There have been two different interpretations of the Bennett
Amendment, both of which are based upon the words "authorized by
the provisions of [the Equal Pay Act]." One interpretation has been
that the Bennett Amendment has incorporated all of the Equal Pay
Act, including its equal work standard, into Title VII and that no sex-
based wage discrimination claim can be brought under Title VII unless
there is a showing of equal work.30 The other interpretation has been
that the Bennett Amendment incorporated into Title VII only the four
specific defenses of the Equal Pay Act: a seniority system; a merit sys-
tem; a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of pro-
duction; or a differential based on any factor other than sex. 31 Three of
those defenses are also expressly recognized by Title VII without refer-
ence to the Equal Pay Act.32 Advocates of this second interpretation
have reasoned that since unequal compensation is prohibited by Title
VII, instances of unequal compensation that are not covered by the
affirmative defenses should be illegal even if the equal work standard is
not met.
Clear interpretation of the Bennett Amendment is difficult not
27. Theoretically, Title VII and the Equal Pay Act work together. The Equal Pay Act pro-
vides a remedy for "equal pay for equal work" violations and Title VII provides a remedy for the
broader category of "employment discrimination." Whether this broader category extends be-
yond "equal pay for equal work" cases to "comparable worth" situations as well, however, de-
pends upon interpretation of the Bennett Amendment's limitations.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
29. Id.
30. This has been the traditional approach of lower courts. See note 24 supra for a list of
cases.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
32. The three defenses listed in Title VII are: a seniority system, a merit system and a system
which measures earnings by quantity or quality. These defenses appear in § 703(h) of Title VII,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976), in the sentence immediately preceding the Bennett Amendment.
See note 118 infra for entire text of sentence.
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only because of the paucity of information about the amendment it-
self 33 but also because the scant legislative history behind the anti-sex
discrimination provision of Title VII is so ambiguous. The main thrust
of the Civil Rights Act was intended to be against racial discrimination.
Up to two days before the bill that was to become the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 was sent to the Senate, sex had not been included as a protected
category. On February 8, 1964, Representative Smith of Virginia
moved to amend the bill by adding the word "sex" after the word "reli-
gion."' 34 Although the amendment passed two days later, there are in-
dications that Smith hoped to defeat the Civil Rights Act through his
amendment.35 Groups such as the Women's Bureau of the U.S. De-
partment of Labor and the American Association of University Wo-
men were opposed to including sex in Title VII.36 According to
Representative Green, those who supported the inclusion of sex in Title
VII were legislators who wished to defeat the Civil Rights Act. Repre-
sentative Green said that such an inclusion would only clutter the bill
and "jeopardize our primary purpose. ' 37 The bill did pass even though
most Congressmen who spoke for the Smith amendment voted against
the bill.3
8
The legislative history surrounding the Bennett Amendment is as
vague as that surrounding the Smith Amendment. In fact, there is even
less information available about the Bennett Amendment. Only three
senators commented on the amendment before it was passed. In intro-
ducing the amendment, Senator Bennett of Utah said that the purpose
of his amendment was to "provide that in the event of conflicts the
provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be nullified. ' 39 Senator
Humphrey spoke next and simply said that "[tihe amendment of the
Senator from Utah is helpful. I believe it is needed." 4 Last to speak
was Senator Dirksen, who said that all the amendment did was recog-
33. See notes 39-44 infra and accompanying text.
34. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964).
35. Id. Representative Smith introduced the proposed amendment by reading from an obvi-
ously frivolous letter from a constituent who complained about the lack of men available for
marriage. Thus, Smith seemed to be illustrating how ludicrous he thought his own amendment
was. Representative Smith was a Southern Democrat who ultimately voted against the Civil
Rights Act. Id.
36. Id. at 2577, 2582.
37. Id. at 2581.
38. Those Congressmen seeming to support the amendment but voting against the Civil
Rights Act included Representatives Smith, Andrews, Dowdy, Gary, Gathings, Huddleston, Pool,
Rivers, Tuten, and Watson. Id. at 2804-05, 15,897 (1964).
39. Id. at 13,647 (1964).
40. Id.
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nize the exceptions that are carried in the Equal Pay Act.4 ' These com-
ments do little to determine whether the Bennett Amendment referred
to the entire Equal Pay Act or just to the four defenses. Senator Ben-
nett's concern with nullification would seem to speak to incorporating
the entire Equal Pay Act, including the equal work standard. However,
Senator Dirksen's focus on the exceptions makes plausible the counter
interpretation of including only the defenses into Title VII.
In commenting upon the Bennett Amendment, courts have given
varying weight to ex post facto statements of senators who had voted
for the Civil Rights Act.42 Even Senator Bennett's own statement that
in his opinion Title VII incorporated the entire Equal Pay Act 43 has not
been treated as an authoritative interpretation. Since the explanation
was made a year after the amendment was passed, courts have been
unsure as to how much weight to attribute to it. 4
The United States Supreme Court has stated that Title VII should
be used to "prohibit all practices in whatever form which create ine-
quality in employment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis
of race, religion, sex, or national origin. ' 45 However, no Supreme
Court decision has analyzed the Bennett Amendment to determine
whether the equal work standard is a limitation on Title VII.46 More-
over, lower court interpretations of the Bennett Amendment have tra-
ditionally appeared only in cases in which plaintiffs had met their
burden of showing equal work.47 In these cases courts did not have to
confront the issue of whether there could be equal pay if there was not
41. Id.
42. In General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 144 (1976), the United States Supreme
Court quoted Senator Humphrey's statement that the Bennett Amendment allowed a continuation
of social security benefits which provide differently for men and women. The Court inferred from
this statement that the entire Equal Pay Act had been incorporated into Title VII. But see Man-
hart v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 553 F.2d 581, 589 (9th Cir. 1976), a/'d in part
and rev'd in part on other grounds, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), where the Ninth Circuit said Humphrey
was erroneous in his interpretation of how the Bennett Amendment affected social security pay-
ments.
43. 111 CONG. REC. 13,359 (1965).
44. See text accompanying notes 72, 73 & 87 infra.
45. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976). In Bowman the Court cited
Senator Humphrey's remark that the Bennett Amendment was not designed "to alter the meaning
of Title VII, but rather merely [to] clarifly] its present intent and effect." Id. at 761. Since Bow-
man involved a claim of racial discrimination the Court's observation about the Bennett Amend-
ment is merely dictum.
46. In General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143-45 (1976), the Supreme Court indicated
that the Bennett Amendment incorporated all of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII. However, since
Gilbert was a claim about pregnancy benefits rather than wage discrimination, the Court's inter-
pretation of the Bennett Amendment is considered dictum. But see note * on page 762 infra.
47. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 262 (10th Cir. 1980);
EEOC v. Aetna Ins. Co., 616 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1980); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d
429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
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equal work. Relief under Title VII was refused unless the equal work
test was met.
48
Until very recently, courts have avoided saying anything about the
Bennett Amendment in relation to comparable work claims. For ex-
ample, in Christensen v. Iowa,49 the plaintiffs asserted that their jobs as
female clerical workers at the University of Iowa had received similar
point evaluations and hence were in the same labor grade as the physi-
cal plant jobs held predominantly by male workers.50 The Eighth Cir-
cuit said that because the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the jobs
in question were "substantially equal" to each other there was no need
to reach the question of interpreting the Bennett Amendment. Because
the court saw the equal work standard as a limitation on Title VII, it
found analysis of the amendment unnecessary.5 1
Since 1979, however, there have been two cases prior to I U.E. in
which courts of appeals have analyzed the Bennett Amendment within
48. In Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905(1970),
the Third Circuit considered the relationship between the Equal Pay Act and Title VII. The court
said that both statutes should be read together so that the Equal Pay Act could not be construed
through the Bennett Amendment as undermining the Civil Rights Act. The Wheaton court found
that the employer's motive in giving male selector-packers a 10% higher wage than women selec-
tor-packers was discriminatory. Women selector-packers were not called upon when it occasion-
ally was necessary to move crates and bottles, even though they were capable of doing that work.
The higher pay to men did not make sense because the additional "flexible" tasks they were asked
to do were usually paid at a lower rate than the duties the men shared with the women. Some of
the language in Wheaton sounds like comparable worth language. For instance, in assessing the
wage differential, the court looked at the economic value of the jobs in question: "[Tihere is no
finding of the economic value of the element of flexibility on which the district court justified the
10% discrimination in pay rate between male and female selector-packers." Id. at 264.
Despite the Wheaton court's recognition of employer motivation, economic value of jobs and
significance of Title VII's broad anti-discrimination policy, Wheaton remains an equal work case.
In the court's view the plaintiffs had met their burden of showing that the job of women selector-
packers was substantially equal to the job of men selector-packers. Therefore, the court did not
have to consider whether the Bennett Amendment applied to cases of comparable worth. Despite
the Wheaton court's identification of the goals of the Equal Pay Act with the goals of Title VII, the
court did not answer the question of the extent to which the Equal Pay Act was incorporated into
Title VII.
Decisions after Wheaton continued to hold that claims brought under Title VII must make a
showing of equal work. See, e.g., Orr v. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971).
49. 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
50. Id. at 354. In 1974 the Iowa State Board of Regents had instituted an evaluation struc-
ture called the Hayes System which attempted to assess the worth of jobs regardless of market
rates. Jobs with similar point evaluations were placed in the same labor grade regardless of job
content. Id.
51. Id. at 356. The Christensen court interpreted the purpose of Title VII as the opening up
of hiring opportunities. Since both clerical jobs and physical plant jobs were open to men and
women, the court found no violation of Title VII. The court also stressed the importance of
market realities in setting wages. Perhaps fearing the consequences of "comparable worth," the
Christensen court expressed an unwillingness to interfere with those realities by telling the em-
ployer to restructure wage rates. Id.
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the context of deciding a comparable work claim. These cases are Gun-
ther v. County of Washington52 and Lemons v. City of Denver.53 In Gun-
ther the Ninth Circuit held that sex-based age discrimination claims
could be brought under Title VII even if there was no showing of "sub-
stantially equal" work. Plaintiffs in Gunther were female prison guards
whose work entailed effort and responsibility which was significantly
different from the work of male prison guards.5 4 The court's analysis of
the Bennett Amendment led to the conclusion that the entire Equal Pay
Act applies to Title VII cases only when plaintiffs make a claim of
"substantially equal" work. According to the Gunther court, plaintiffs
can claim discriminatory compensation without an equal work allega-
tion because Title VII is not limited by the equal work standard. 55
In contrast to Gunther, the decision of the Lemons court was con-
sistent with the traditional judicial interpretation 56 that the Bennett
Amendment incorporated the equal work standard into Title VII. The
plaintiffs in Lemons were nurses who wanted to be paid on a scale
equal to jobs in the community other than those of nurses. They ar-
gued that, since nurses had been historically underpaid and since
nurses had almost universally been women, the City of Denver was
engaging in sex discrimination by perpetuating the pattern of paying
nurses low wages. The Tenth Circuit held that because the plaintiffs
had not shown that their work was equal to the work of those in the
General Administrative Series category with which they sought com-
parison, there was no reason to grant the plaintiffs relief.57
As illustrated by the judicial interpretations of the Equal Pay Act
and Title VII, comparable worth has only recently been recognized as a
viable claim. The fact that the Gunther court and the Lemons court did
52. 623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979), afl'd, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623 (June 8, 1981).
53. 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980).
54. 623 F.2d at 1308. The male guards were in charge of more than ten times as many
prisoners as were the female guards. The female guards did a large amount of clerical work while
the males did very little.
55. Id. at 1311, 1313. Since Gunther did not involve claims of jobs having comparable value
to the employer, it is not considered a comparable worth case. However, the Gunther court's
allowing a claim based on comparable work-i.e., similar jobs that do not meet the equal work
standard-can be considered a break-through for comparable worth. Both comparable work and
comparable worth depend upon going beyond the equal work standard. See notes 10 & 27 supra.
56. See notes 9 & 24 supra.
57. In the Lemons court's view, the Civil Rights Act is supposed to create hiring opportuni-
ties, not compensate for disparities which have resulted from past attitudes and practices. Citing.
Christensen, the Lemons court said there is no sex-based wage discrimination claim for plaintiffs
who cannot show equal work. Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit stated that employers are not re-
quired by the Civil Rights Act to ignore the market in setting wage rates for job classifications.
620 F.2d at 229-30.
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not agree in their analyses of the Bennett Amendment makes I UE v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp. an especially significant decision.
I U.E V WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP.
THE TRIAL COURT DECISION
The plaintiffs in I. .E. based their allegations on a wage structure
instituted by Westinghouse in the late 1930s.- 8 Numerical points, given
on the basis of knowledge, required training, specific demands and re-
sponsibilities, had been assigned by Westinghouse managers to various
job classifications. The total number of points determined the "grade"
at which each job was evaluated; the grade, in turn, determined the
hourly wage rate. Under this structure female jobs had been paid on a
lower wage curve than male jobs, even though female jobs had been
given evaluations comparable to more highly paid male jobs.5 9
In the mid- 1960s Westinghouse increased the number of labor
grades from nine to thirteen. They also instituted a unitary wage scale
that eliminated any explicit sexual designation. 60 However, these ac-
tions did not result in a proportionate wage increase for women. Al-
most all of the women were placed in the lower labor grades and
almost all of the men were placed in the higher grades.6' The female
dominated categories, such as assembly liner and quality control
worker, continued to receive lower wages than the male dominated jobs
such as janitor and machine operator. The plaintiffs contended that
enlargement and redistribution of labor grades resulted in women
holding jobs at a lower grade than the designation given to that job
before the addition of labor grades and the development of the unitary
wage scale. According to the plaintiffs' claim, redistribution of labor
grades perpetuated the blatant sex-based discrimination of previous
years so that what appeared to be non-sexist employer conduct was
actually a subterfuge for continued discrimination against women.62
The district court granted Westinghouse's motion to dismiss, hold-
ing that the plaintiffs' allegations did not state a claim upon which re-
lief could be granted under Title VII.63 The court said that in passing
the Equal Pay Act Congress had limited judicial intervention into busi-
58. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 450, 451 (D.N.J. 1979).
59. Id. Westinghouse's 1939 manual blatantly stated that women with the same point rating
as men received lower wages.
60. 631 F.2d 1094, 1097 (1980).
61. Id. at 1097-98.
62. Id.
63. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 456-57.
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ness by rejecting comparable work in favor of equal work as the stan-
dard for equal pay. In the district court's view, the Bennett
Amendment incorporated the equal work standard into Title VII;
therefore, the plaintiffs' claim, because it failed to show equal work,
was denied.
THE APPELLATE COURT DECISION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed
and remanded the decision of the district court.64 In reaching its con-
clusion that the Bennett Amendment did not preclude the validity of a
comparable worth claim under Title VII, the court emphasized the
anti-discrimination thrust of Title VI165 and then proceeded to examine
statutory language, legislative history, EEOC guidelines and case law.
In examining statutory language, the court emphasized the impor-
tance of the Bennett Amendment phrase "authorized by." This phrase
links the Equal Pay Act to Title VII; wage differentials are allowed
under Title VII only if they are "authorized by" the Equal Pay Act.66
The court asserted that the common meaning of "authorized by" is
"permitted." Based on this definition, the court concluded that the
only provisions of the Equal Pay Act incorporated into Title VII were
the four defensespermitted by the Act. The court called this the "broad
coverage" interpretation because it did not impose the equal work stan-
dard as a limitation on Title VII.67
The court's analysis of language involved the rejection of the in
pari materia canon of statutory construction. Statutes that are in pari
materia with one another are those which share the same subject or
which have a common purpose.6 8 The general rule is that such statutes
are to be construed together. The inpari materia canon prevents a stat-
64. 631 F.2d at 1138. The Third Circuit took the plaintiffs' allegations as true for the purpose
of considering the motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1097 n.3. The court's decision to reverse
and remand the decision of the district court entitled the plaintiffs to a trial on the merits.
65. 631 F.2d at 1099-1100.
66. The text of the Bennett Amendment is as follows:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any employer
to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the wages or compen-
sation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentiation is author-
ized by the provisions of (the Equal Pay Act].
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
67. 631 F.2d at 1099. In contrast to the Third Circuit's interpretation of the phrase "author-
ized by" is that of the New Jersey district court. The district court had accepted the defendant's
definition of "authorized by" as meaning "prohibited," and had held that "any conduct that is not
prohibited by the Equal Pay Act is 'authorized' by that act. 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 450,
453 (D.N.J. 1979).
68. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979),
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ute dealing with a narrow subject from being submerged into a later,
more general statute.69 The court said this canon conflicted with other
principles of statutory interpretation, such as allowing for supplemental
remedies 70 and regarding omissions in later statutes as being signifi-
cant. 7' The court reasoned that, since Title VII gave additional reme-
dies to claims of discriminatory employment practices and since the
equal work standard was omitted from Title VII, the equal work stan-
dard of the Equal Pay Act should not be interpreted as a limitation on
the broader, more recent Civil Rights Act.
After examining statutory construction, the court turned to legisla-
tive history as a source for understanding the Bennett Amendment.
The court evaluated that history as being characterized by "equivocacy
and turbidity. '72 The court pointed out that it was unclear whether
references to the Equal Pay Act alluded to the entire Act, including the
equal work standard, or to only the four exceptions listed in the Act.
Working from the premise that the Civil Rights Act has a broad policy
against sex discrimination, the court reasoned that there would have
been more debate over the Bennett Amendment if the understanding
had been that Title VII could not go beyond the equal work criteria of
the Equal Pay Act. 73 The court admitted that Senator Bennett's expla-
nation 74 a year after the enactment of Title VII seemed to indicate that
all of the Equal Pay Act should be incorporated into Title VII, but the
court dismissed the statement because it did not reveal the intent of
Congress itself when it passed the amendment.75
Next, the court looked to EEOC guidelines 76 and observed that
there had been a significant change in the way the EEOC interpreted
the relationship between the Equal Pay Act and Title VII. In 1965, the
EEOC guidelines on sex-based wage discrimination applied the equal
work standard to sex-based wage discrimination. claims brought under
69. See Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976); Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974).
70. 631 F.2d at 1101. The court cited Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49
n.9 (1974), in which the Supreme Court said differences between statutes should not be ignored,
for such differences make supplemental remedies possible.
71. The court cited Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 928 (3d Cir. 1977), Tooahnippah v.
Hickel, 397 U.S. 598 (1970), and General Elec. Co. v. Southern Constr. Co., 383 F.2d 135, 138 (5th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 955 (1968), for dicta that asserted the significance of statutes that
omit provisions of earlier statutes.
72. 631 F.2d at 1101.
73. Id. at 1102-03.
74. 111 CONG. REC. 13,359 (1965).
75. 631 F.2d at 1104.
76. Id. at 1105-06.
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Title VII.77 However, by 1972, the criterion of equal work had been
eliminated by the EEOC as a test for discriminatory compensation
claims. 78 The Third Circuit interpreted the 1965 recognition of the
equal work standard as not precluding the possibility that the scope of
Title VII was greater than the scope of the Equal Pay Act. This inter-
pretation allowed the court to focus on the less restrictive 1972 guide-
lines.
The last area the court investigated was case law. Noting that the
U.S. Supreme Court had not conclusively defined the relationship be-
tween the Equal Pay Act and Title VII,7 9 the court looked to Gunther v.
County of Washington80 to support its interpretation of the Bennett
Amendment. Distinguishing Lemons v. City of Denver8' on its facts,82
the I UE court saw Gunther as the only case that had directly faced
the same issues83 confronted in the instant case.
THE DISSENTING OPINION
Judge Van Dusen's dissenting opinion 84 also focused on the Ben-
nett Amendment as the key to deciding the instant case and, like the
majority opinion, analyzed statutory language, legislative history,
EEOC guidelines and case law. However, the dissent arrived at differ-
ent answers in each of the explored areas.
The principle of inpari materia,85 which prevents a more specific
statute from being submerged into a more general one, led the dissent
to interpret Title VII consistently with the Equal Pay Act's equal work
standard. In comparing the wording of the Equal Pay Act with the
wording of Title VII, the dissent also found that if the four defenses
were the only part of the Equal Pay Act to be incorporated into Title
VII, the Bennett Amendment would be "largely redundant. '86 Since
Title VII already provided for three of the four defenses87 listed in the
77. 29 C.F.R. § 1607(a) (1965).
78. Id. § 1604.8 (1978).
79. 631 F.2d at 1106-07.
80. 623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979), afrd, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623 (June 8, 1981).
81. 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980).
82. 631 F.2d at 1107. The IU.E court said that Lemons was distinguishable because the
Lemons court had found that sex discrimination was not the reason for the wage differential
between the Lemons plaintiffs and the employees with whom they sought to be compared.
83. Gunther, like I. U.E, interpreted the Bennett Amendment in relation to a claim that did
not allege equal work. Unlike the Lemons plaintiffs, the Gunther plaintiffs alleged intentional
discrimination.
84. Id. at 1108-15.
85. See notes 66-67 supra & 107-112 infra and accompanying text.
86. 631 F.2d at I111.
87. The three defenses listed in Title VII are a seniority system, a merit system, and a system
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Equal Pay Act, the dissent thought it was unnecessary to reincorporate
them through the Bennett Amendment. 88
Judge Van Dusen viewed the admittedly ambiguous legislative
history as being favorable to Westinghouse's position that Congress
wanted to include all of the Equal Pay Act in Title VII. He found it
particularly meaningful that the Equal Pay Act specifically rejected the
comparable work standard. In addition, Judge Van Dusen found pre-
cedent for weighing Senator Bennett's expostfacto statement that the
entire Equal Pay Act had been incorporated into Title VII.89
The dissent interpreted both case law and EEOC guidelines as
limiting Title VII to equal work standards. Judge Van Dusen read the
1965 EEOC guidelines more narrowly than did the majority, and con-
cluded that they restricted sex-based wage discrimination cases to the
equal work test.90 Following the judicial preference for administrative
agency guidelines which are contemporaneous with a legislative act,9 '
the dissent dismissed the significance of the broader 1972 guidelines. 92
With regard to case law, the dissent pointed out that until Gunther
v. County of Washington,93 no court of appeals had held that a claim of
sex-based wage discrimination could be made without a demonstration
that the plaintiff was performing equal work.94 The dissent questioned
the reliability of Gunther because in that decision the Ninth Circuit had
failed to apply the in pari materia canon to its interpretation of the
Bennett Amendment.
At the end of his opinion Judge Van Dusen expressed his fear that
the majority's analysis of the Bennett Amendment would destroy the
balance between Title VII's general guarantee of equal job opportuni-
ties and the specificity of the equal work standard.95 The dissent's ap-
prehension was that unless Title VII was restricted by the equal work
standard, judges would have no basis upon which to exclude evidence.
which measures earnings by quantity or quality. These defenses appear in § 703(h) of Title VII in
the sentence immediately preceding the Bennett Amendment. See note 118 infra for entire text of
that sentence.
The only wage discrimination defense contained in the Equal Pay Act but not in Title VII is
"a differential based on any other factor other than sex." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
88. 631 F.2d at 1112.
89. See Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 87 n.4 (1968); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522,
527 (1954); and Sioux v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 329-30 (1942).
90. 631 F.2d at 1113-14.
91. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-43 (1976).
92. 631 F.2d at 1114.
93. 623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979), aft'd, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623 (June 8, 1981).
94. See Orr v. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865
(1975); Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971).
95. 631 F.2d at 1114-15.
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Judge Van Dusen feared the court's entanglement in what he believed
were decisions which should remain in the marketplace. 96
ANALYSIS
I U.E. v. Westinghouse presented the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit with a difficult problem. The facts of the
case indicated that women workers at Westinghouse's Trenton plant
were not being compensated equally with male workers at the plant.
Westinghouse's past history of sex-based wage discrimination 97 as well
as the current wage statistics at the Trenton plant constituted a situa-
tion which did not seem in keeping with the spirit of Title VII. Implicit
in the court's decision was the belief that equal rights for women
should bring an opportunity for equal rewards, and that such rewards
should not be prevented by ambiguous legislative history or limited ju-
dicial interpretation. Encouraged by the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Gunther, the I U.E court analyzed the relationship between the Equal
Pay Act and Title VII so that it harmonized with the broad anti-dis-
crimination goals of the Civil Rights Act. The court's interpretation of
the Bennett Amendment was based upon the underlying premise that
Title VII should be used to prevent job inequality no matter what form
that inequality takes. An indication of the court's concern is evidenced
by the fact that the court both began and ended its decision with allu-
sions to the broad aims of Title VII.
The difficulty with the I U.E. decision is that while it is directed at
the problem of undervaluing and undercompensating women's work,
the court's analysis does not withstand objective appraisal. In each step
of its analysis of the Bennett Amendment, the court admitted that there
were conflicting views of statutory construction, legislative history,
EEOC guidelines and case law. Nonetheless, the court seemed deter-
mined to circumvent these problems because of its predisposition to
find support for Title VII's broad policy.
The Bennett Amendment phrase "authorized by" is ambiguous
enough to make either the majority's or the dissent's interpretation
96. Accord, Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353, 356 (8th Cir. 1977), where the court said that
market realities are instrumental in establishing wages, and it is not the business of courts to get
involved in those decisions.
97. 631 F.2d at 1097. Westinghouse's industrial relations manual, published in 1939, stated
that female employees were paid on a wage scale lower than that used for paying male employees.
Westinghouse did not change the labor grades on which the wage scales were based until the mid-
1960s. The plaintiffs in L U.E claimed that the new labor grades instituted in the 1960s perpetu-
ated unequal pay for women. Id. at 1098. See notes 56-60 supra, and accompanying text.
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plausible. 98 Similarly, the words used during congressional debate over
the Bennett Amendment do not clearly reveal whether all or only part
of the Equal Pay Act was to be incorporated into Title VII. 99 Rather
than pursuing the history of the Equal Pay Act and the tradition of
.interpreting the Act's specific requirements, the court found that the
ambiguity of the Bennett Amendment was enough to prevent the Equal
Pay Act from limiting Title VII.' °0 The court was careful to limit its
holding to finding a Title VII violation only on the basis of intentional
discrimination. 0 1 However, in pursuing policy concerns the court lost
sight of the limitations which have accompanied not only sex discrimi-
nation cases, but other Title VII cases as well.
The I UE. court's lack of understanding is apparent in its com-
parison of the instant case with a hypothetical situation in which weld-
ers would be paid more than plumbers because the welders were
Protestants and the plumbers were Catholics. According to the court,
this would clearly violate Title VII because it would classify employees
in such a manner as to deprive them of employment opportunities such
as higher wages.' 02 However, the majority's hypothetical situation
about welders and plumbers was not based upon the usual judicial in-
terpretation of Title VII. As long as Catholics and Protestants have
equal opportunity to become welders or plumbers there could be no
Title VII claim. Court decisions on Title VII claims have been directed
at granting relief to plaintiffs 0 3 who have not had equal hiring oppor-
tunities. Courts have not used Title VII to determine wages or to com-
pare jobs of varying skill or responsibility.' °4 The closest courts have
come to interfering with employer practices has been to examine
whether an employment requirement was actually a pretext for hiring
98. The (U.E. majority said that "authorized by" meant "permitted." According to this
definition, the only wage differentials allowed by Title VII are those permitted by the Equal Pay
Act. Such an interpretation incorporates only the four defenses of the Equal Pay Act into Title
VII. The dissent in I U.E. would accept that "authorized by" can mean "prohibited." Under this
interpretation, the equal work standard determines equal pay unless one of the four defenses
prohibits that standard from applying.
99. See notes 36-41 supra and accompanying text.
100. 631 F.2d at 1101-03.
101. Id. The Z U.E. plaintiffs, unlike the plaintiffs in Lemons, did not base their claim simply
on the historic undervaluation and undercompensation of women workers. The I U.E. plaintiffs
alleged that Westinghouse had intentionaly structured labor grades so that jobs normally held by
women would receive lower pay.
102. Id. at 1096-97.
103. Religion, race, color, sex and national origin are protected by Title VII. If a plaintiff can
show he was not hired because an employer discriminated against any of these categories, he can
establish a Title VII claim.
104. See Orr v. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865
(1975); Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971).
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discrimination. 05
Regardless of how important the policy behind Title VII is, an
analysis of its interrelationship with the Equal Pay Act should be ex-
amined according to objective standards, and not simply accepted as a
reflection of a general anti-discrimination thrust.106 It is with this cau-
tion that a critical assessment of the court's interpretation of the Ben-
nett Amendment should proceed.
Statutory Construction
Analyzing a statute according to rules of statutory construction is
one way to discover the meaning of a congressional amendment. In
interpreting the Bennett Amendment, the Third Circuit rejected the ca-
non of inpari materia in order to avoid seeing the equal work standard
as a limitation on Title VII. However, case law interpreting rules of
construction is more supportive of the dissent's determination that the
in par materia principle should be used to assess the relationship be-
tween the Equal Pay Act and Title VII. Such an approach would lead
to the conclusion that all of the Equal Pay Act, and not just the four
defenses, had been incorporated into Title VII.10 7
In Morton v. Mancari0 8 the U.S. Supreme Court articulated the
canon of in pari materia, saying that "where there is no clear intention
otherwise a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a gen-
eral one, regardless of the priority of enactment."10 9 In Radzanower v.
105. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear
that racial discrimination could not be practiced by setting up false hiring qualifications. A high
school diploma and intelligence tests were considered discriminatory requirements because they
were not related to the jobs in question and because the effect of the requirements was to exclude
blacks.
See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), and McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), for other cases in which the Supreme Court has defined the purpose of
Title VII to be the removal of discriminatory hiring barriers.
106. The I. U.E. court misapplied a Title VII case to the instant case when it inserted a refer-
ence to the Equal Pay Act within a quotation from United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979). In Weber the issue was the legitimacy of a voluntary, private
industry affirmative action program for blacks. The irony that the Weber court perceived was not
that another law should limit Title VII, but that Title VII itself should be used to frustrate the very
goals it was intended to carry out. This is very different from asserting, as the I U.E. court did,
that the Equal Pay Act should not limit Title VII. The L U.E. court paraphrased the quotation
from Weber as follows: "It would be ironic indeed if (the Equal Pay Act] a law triggered by a
Nation's concern over centuries of [sexual discrimination] and intended to improve the lot of those
who had 'been excluded from the American dream for so long' . . ." The L U.E. court finished
the sentence in its own words: "were to lead to the contraction of their rights under Title VII."
631 F.2d at 1107.
107. If the inpari materia canon is followed, then the more specific Equal Pay Act provisions
cannot be submerged by the later provisions of the more general Civil Rights Act.
108. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
109. Id. at 550-51.
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Touche Ross & Co. 110 the Supreme Court reiterated its position in Mor-
ton, stating that the basic principle of statutory construction is that "a
statute dealing with a narrow, precise and specific subject is not sub-
merged by a later enacted statute covering a more generalized spec-
trum.""' Since the Bennett Amendment did not specifically reject the
equal work standard, application of the canon of inpari materia would
prevent the Equal Pay Act's precise equal work standard from being
submerged by Title VII's more general provisions. Furthermore, Con-
gress' lengthy debates and careful determination to have an equal work
standard 1 2 make it unlikely that one year later Congress would intend
the Civil Rights Act to do away with such specificity.
The majority's alternate approaches to statutory construction are
unconvincing as well. Neither the principle of finding supplemental
remedies nor the principle of statutory omissions is relevant to the rela-
tionship of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII. In Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co. 113 the Supreme Court held that one can sue under both
Title VII and another statute because remedies can supplement each
other. 14 However, this holding does not negate the principle of inpari
materia, as the majority says it does. The fact that statutes can supple-
ment each other does not mean that a clear limitation on a statute
should not be acknowledged. In like manner, recognizing that the
omission of a statutory provision from a later statute means that the
earlier and later statute each have a different intent" 15 does not defeat
the in pari materia principle. The equal work standard is not omitted
from Title VII if the Bennett Amendment is interpreted so as to incor-
porate that standard.
In addition to presenting rather weak statutory interpretations, the
majority was also unconvincing when it addressed the issue of redun-
dancy. 1 6 Three of the four exceptions 17 listed in the Equal Pay Act
also appear in the part of section 703(h) of Title VII which precedes 18
110. 426 U.S. 148 (1976).
Ill. Id. at 153.
112. See notes 13-20 supra & 121-25 infra and accompanying text.
113. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
114. Id. at 48.
115. See Richerson v. Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 928 (3d Cir. 1977); General Elec. Co. v. Southern
Constr. Co., 383 F.2d 135, 138 n.4 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 955 (1968).
116. 631 F.2d at 1101.
117. A seniority system; a merit system; a system which measures quantity or quality of pro-
duction.
118. § 703(h) consists of two long sentences, of which the Bennett Amendment is the second.
The first sentence reads as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or dif-
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the Bennett Amendment. It seems likely, therefore, that the Bennett
Amendment would incorporate more of the Equal Pay Act than just
those exceptions. The court's reasoning that repetition is important for
clarification is not persuasive. Clarity is achieved without that repeti-
tion. The Bennett Amendment would have little purpose if it simply
repeated the sentence preceding it, making only one addition." 9 If
Congress wanted to include only the four defenses in the Bennett
Amendment it could have simply amended Title VII by adding the one
defense not contained in the first part of section 703(h). This would
have achieved the same result of making the defenses of the two acts
coextensive.
Legislative History
While the Third Circuit examined the ambiguity of legislative
materials on the Bennett Amendment, the court did not explore the
legislative history behind the Equal Pay Act. Such an omission im-
pedes an understanding of the Bennett Amendment, for the legislative
history behind the Equal Pay Act reveals Congress' care in specifically
choosing the equal work standard.
In debates prior to the passage of the Equal Pay Act, Congress
considered and rejected the concept of comparable work 20 in favor of
the principle of equal work.12' Representative Goodell, the bill's spon-
sor, said that the changing of "comparable" to "equal" was a deliberate
action, the intent of which was to narrow the area of wage discrimina-
tion to those jobs identical or at least "very much alike or closely re-
lated to each other."' 22
ferent terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or
merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production
or to employees who work in different locations, provided that such differences are not
the result of an intention to discriminate becauge of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, nor shall it be unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act
upon the result of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its
administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discrimi-
nate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
119. The only defense that is included in the Equal Pay Act but not in Title VII is "a differen-
tial based on any other factor other than sex." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
120. A showing of comparable work does not require that skill, effort, responsibility and work-
ing conditions be substantially equal.
121. The equal work standard requires equal skill, effort, responsibility, and similar working
conditions. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
122. 109 CONG. REC. 9197 (1963). Representative Goodell emphasized that Congress did not
expect the Labor Department to rate jobs that were not equal. "We do not want to hear the
Department [of Labor] say, 'Well, they amount to the same thing' and evaluate them so they come
up to the same skill or point." Id. Representative Goodell went on to say that it was "not in-
tended that the Secretary of Labor or the courts will substitute their judgment for the judgment of
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This scrupulous defining of the equal work standard makes it
questionable that, in passing the Civil Rights Act only one year later,
Congress would change the criteria for sex-based wage discrimination
claims. The inclusion of sex as a protected class under Title VII was
not envisioned as an expansion of women's rights. Even supporters of
women's rights did not favor the inclusion of a sex provision in Title
VII.123 The inclusion of sex into Title VII not only came late in the
legislative process, it came after very little debate or deliberation. In
fact, it is likely that the proposal to include sex discrimination was
made insincerely in order to thwart passage of the Civil Rights Act. ' 24
Although this fact does not diminish the status of sex as a protected
category, it makes it doubtful that Congress meant the inclusion of sex
to cancel out the Equal Pay Act's equal work standard. In light of
these facts, the court's dismissal of legislative history as "equivocal and
turbid" 125 is unpersuasive. Moreover, the court's conclusion that legis-
lative history favored the plaintiffs' interpretation of the Bennett
Amendment is unfounded. The fact is that the Third Circuit did little
to uncover Congress' intent in passing the Civil Rights Act.
Senator Bennett referred to his proposed amendment as a "techni-
cal correction"'' 26 to Title VII. This phrase can be interpreted to sup-
port either the defendant's or the plaintiffs' view of the Bennett
Amendment. It can be argued that a correction that is merely technical
does not limit Title VII very much. On the other hand, a technical
correction can define the appropriate relation between the two acts. A
more important statement of Senator Bennett's was his explanation of
the amendment at the time he introduced it. Senator Bennett's major
concern was that the Equal Pay Act not be nullified. 127 However, if all
the employer . . . . It is not the business of the Secretary of Labor to write job evaluations or
judge the merits of job evaluation systems." Id. at 9209. Representative Frelinghuysen echoed
Representative Goodell in the following statement:
[Tihe jobs in dispute must be the same in work content, effort, skill, and responsibility
requirements, and in work conditions. As indicated earlier, it is not intended to compare
unrelated jobs or jobs that have been historically and normally considered by the indus-
try to be different. Violations usually will be apparent, and will almost always occur in
the same work area and where the same tasks are performed.
Id. at 9196. A further illustration of the insistence that the work be equal and not comparable
appeared in Representative Griffin's hypothetical example of the jobs of two inspectors of engines.
If one inspector made a cursory examination of an engine and the other examined a complex part
of an engine, their jobs would not be compared to one another in a claim brought under the Equal
Pay Act. Id. at 9198.
123. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
124. See notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
125. 631 F.2d at 1101.
126. 110 CONG. REC. 13,647 (1964).
127. Id. Senator Bennett said, "The purpose of my amendment is to provide that in the event
of conflicts, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be nullified."
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Senator Bennett was referring to was the four defenses listed in the
Equal Pay Act, nullification would not have been much of a threat,
since three of those exceptions were already part of section 703(h).
However, an amendment was needed if the equal work standard was in
danger of being nullified. 28 Title VII could have nullified the Equal
Pay Act by its general statement against sex discrimination. By incor-
porating the whole of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII, the Bennett
Amendment limited sex-based wage discrimination to the standard of
equal work.129
Given this much indication that the Equal Pay Act was to continue
to set wage standards, it was merely repetitive that one year after the
Civil Rights Act Senator Bennett clearly explained that the equal work
standard was a limitation on Title VII.130 Nevertheless, Senator Ben-
nett's remarks were not unimportant, and the. LUIE court was not jus-
tified in completely dismissing them. It is true that Senator Bennett
spoke only what was in his mind a year after the Act was passed and
not what was in the minds of Congress when they voted on the Civil
Rights Act.' 3' Nevertheless, such an unambiguous statement by the
proposer of a bill should carry some weight.' 32
128. The dissent in. U.E. agreed that Senator Bennett's fear of nullification was ambiguous
because he did not spell out which provisions he was afraid would be nullified. However, the
dissent stated that it would be more logical to read Senator Bennett's remarks as referring to the
equal work standard. 631 F.2d at 1113.
129. Senators other than Senator Bennett also recognized the need to maintain the criterion of
equal work. In answer to Senator Dirksen's concern that anti-discrimination provisions for sex
might extend far beyond the Equal Pay Act because they didn't include equal work limitations,
Senator Clark assured Senator Dirksen that as far as wage setting was concerned, the Equal Pay
Act would continue to set the standard. 110 CONG. REC. 7217 (1964). Thus, according to Senator
Clark, Title VII was construed inpari materia with the Equal Pay Act.
In light of Senator Dirksen's concern and Senator Clark's explanation, Senator Dirksen's
subsequent comment to the Congress that all the Bennett Amendment did was carry out the ex-
ceptions in the Equal Pay Act did not necessarily mean that Senator Dirksen was referring only to
the four affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act. 110 CONG. REC. 13,647 (1964). Senator Dirk-
sen's use of the word "exceptions" is not completely clear. Instead of referring to the four de-
fenses, Senator Dirksen could have meant exceptions to what had been the practice of wage-
setting in the past, especially since he described the Equal Pay Act as an amendment to the Fair
Labor Standards Act. The phrase "carries out . . . exceptions" connotes a positive program
rather than limitations.
130. 111 CONG. REC. 13,359 (1965).
131. 631 F.2d at 1104.
132. TheI. L.E court cited Gunther v. County of Washington, 623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979),
affd, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623 (June 8, 1981), in support of not valuing ex post'facto statements. How-
ever, Gunther relied on Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954), and this reliance was misplaced.
Galvan did value ex postfacto explanations of a bill, even though it recognized that such state-
ments were not binding. However, as Judge Van Dusen noted in his dissent in L U.E., Haynes v.
United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968), also said that subsequent views shed light on a bill's purpose.
631 F.2d at 1113.
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EEOC Guidelines
The L U.E. court's rejection of the 1965 EEOC guidelines in favor
of the 1972 guidelines was contrary to the United States Supreme
Court's preference for guidelines which are contemporaneous with the
federal legislation they purport to interpret. 33 The 1965 guidelines
said that the "standards of 'equal pay for equal work' set forth in the
Equal Pay Act for determining what is unlawful discrimination in com-
pensation are applicable to Title VII.''t34 The . U. court's reasoning
that the 1965 guidelines still left room for sex-based wage discrimina-
tion claims that do not meet equal work standards seems unreasonable
in view of the clear wording of those guidelines. The 1972 guidelines
omit the equal work standard as a criterion for deciding Title VII
claims. 35 The Supreme Court has made it clear that if EEOC guide-
lines conflict, courts are to favor the earlier guidelines. 136
Case Law
The fourth area of the court's analysis was relevant case law.
While the court of appeals was correct in saying that the Supreme
Court has not explicitly defined the Equal Pay Act's relation to Title
VII, it is not true that "caselaw [sic], for the most part, adds little" to
the inquiry. 137 Lower federal courts have consistently held that sex-
based wage discrimination claims under Title VII must be founded
upon a showing of equal work. 38 While courts have commented that
the Bennett Amendment incorporated only the four exceptions listed in
the Equal Pay Act, such statements have appeared merely as dicta in
cases where the Bennett Amendment was not basic to the decision 139 or
133. In General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-43 (1976), the United States Supreme
Court discussed EEOC guidelines regarding the question of pregnancy as an employment disabil-
ity. The Court said that the 1965 guidelines were to be followed rather than the 1972 guidelines
because more weight should be given to guidelines that are contemporaneous with legislation.
The Court also said that although EEOC guidelines do not have the force of government regula-
tions, they do have some persuasive power.
134. 29 C.F.R. § 1607(a) (1965).
135. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.8 (1978).
136. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-43 (1976).
137. 631 F.2d at 1106.
138. See Roesel v. Joliet Wrought Washer Co., 596 F.2d 183 (7th Cir. 1979); Di Salvo v.
Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1978); Angelo v. Bacharach Instrument Co., 555
F.2d 1164 (3rd Cir. 1977); Orr v. MacNeill & Son, Inc., 511 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 865 (1975); Ammons v. Zia Co., 448 F.2d 117 (10th Cir. 1971).
139. In Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1086 (1978), and in Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905
(1970), there was dicta to the effect that the Bennett Amendment included only the four defenses
listed in the Equal Pay Act. However both Laffey and Wheaton were cases in which plaintiffs had
fulfilled their burdens of compliance with the equal work standard.
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where wage discrimination was not the central issue. 140 Because courts
assumed that the equal work standard had been incorporated into Title
VII, there was no case prior to Gunther v. County of Washington 141 in
which a court that was faced with facts of non-equal work had ana-
lyzed the Bennett Amendment.
Gunther is cited by the I U.E court as the only case in which a
court of appeals "has squarely faced the issue" 42 raised in I U.E. The
Gunther court interpreted the Bennett Amendment as incorporating
only the four exceptions of the Equal Pay Act. Gunther, however, mis-
read legislative history and made the Bennett Amendment say some-
thing it never was intended to say. The Gunther court looked at only
those historic facts which favored the court's holding. It neither ex-
plored the ambiguous history behind the inclusion of sex in the Civil
Rights Act nor confronted the clear intention of Congress in passing
the Equal Pay Act. 143 The Gunther court also ignored rules of statutory
construction'" and failed to analyze the EEOC guidelines in any de-
tail. ' 45
The I U.E. court distinguished Lemons v. City of Denver 46 on the
basis that the Lemons court found that sex discrimination did not ac-
count for women's low wages in that case. "47 The distinction begs the
question. The Third Circuit did not explore the Lemons decision to
determine why the Lemons court concluded there was no sex discrimi-
nation at issue. If the I UE court had analyzed Lemons it would have
found that the Lemons result rested on the traditional interpretation of
140. In Manhart v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 553 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1976),
ard in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 435 U.S. 702 (1978), the plaintiffs challenged a
retirement plan requiring greater contributions from women. The court said that the retirement
plan was unaffected by any of the Equal Pay Act's defenses. The court then went on to say that
"all that the Bennett Amendment did was to incorporate the exemptions of the Equal Pay Act into
Title VII." 553 F.2d at 590.
141. 623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979), afl'd, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623 (June 8, 1981).
142. 631 F.2d at 1106.
143. The Gunther court, like the L U.E court, did not discuss the careful determination of
Congress in choosing the equal work standard when it passed the Equal Pay Act of 1963. Further-
more, the Gunther court did not acknowledge, as the I U.E. court did, that the history behind the
Bennett Amendment and the inclusion of sex in Title VII is open to more than one reading. The
Gunther court did not adequately recognize the possibility of reading the Bennett Amendment as
incorporating all of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII. The court did not analyze Senator Bennett's
concern about nullification of the Equal Pay Act, nor did it look at Representative Clark's expla-
nation to Senator Dirksen that the function of the Bennett Amendment was to ensure that the
Equal Pay Act would be a limitation on Title VII. See notes 127-29 supra and accompanying text.
144. As the . U.E. dissenting opinion pointed out, there was no analysis in Gunther of the in
pari materia principle of statutory construction. 631 F.2d at 1114 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting).
145. The Gunther court did not discuss the problems of following the 1972 guidelines rather
than the 1965 guidelines.
146. 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980).
147. 631 F.2d at 1107.
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the Bennett Amendment 48 as well as on the apprehension of the bur-
dens that comparable worth could impose upon courts and upon em-
ployers.' 49  Even though Lemons differed from I U.E. in that the
Lemons plaintiffs did not allege intentional discrimination, 5 0 the Lem-
ons court's decision was grounded not on the lack of intent, but on the
court's interpretation of the relationship between the Equal Pay Act
and Title VII. Lemons, like all the relevant cases before Gunther and
. UE., stands for the principle that without a showing of equal work
there can be no claim for sex-based wage discrimination.
The study of relevant case law, like the study of statutory lan-
guage, legislative history and EEOC guidelines, does little to justify the
decision reached by the I U.E. court.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
It has become natural for citizens to look to the courts for the solu-
tion to problems when legislation does not seem to solve social inequal-
ity. Given the history of women in low paying jobs and the ongoing
reinforcement of that history,' 5 ' it is easy to understand such a desire
for judicial intervention. However, if a court purports to decide policy
148. The Lemons court saw the Bennett Amendment as incorporating the entire Equal Pay
Act into Title VII. 620 F.2d at 229-30.
149. The Lemons court cited Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977), as authority
for the proposition that courts are not required to decide claims under Title VII if there is no
showing of equal work. It also cited Christensen as authority for the proposition that Title VII
does not require an employer to ignore the marketplace in setting wage rates for different work
classifications. 620 F.2d at 229.
150. Title VII does not distinguish between intentional and non-intentional discrimination. If
a seemingly neutral practice has an adverse impact on those protected by Title VII, the employer
still has the burden of proving the necessity of the practice once the plaintiff has established a
prima facie case. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Hodgson v. Robert Hall
Clothes, Inc., 473 F.2d 589 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass
Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 705 (1970); Wisconsin Nat'l Organization for
Women v. Wisconsin, 417 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1976).
151. See generaly Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 399 (1979). According to Professor Blumrosen, the
tradition of paying women lower wages continues because employers still categorize and evaluate
jobs along sex-discrimination lines. For example, employers exclude physical tasks from jobs for
which they hire women, and then pay more for jobs which include physical responsibilities. The
wage scale for what are seen as traditional women's jobs becomes established, and employers then
argue that they are justified in following the community standard for wages. The custom of pay-
ing less for work done by women makes women exploitable, and sex-related job requirements
reinforce the custom. The vicious circle continues as women who are shut out of higher paying
jobs then crowd into the available lower paying jobs. As the supply of female workers for these
increases, entry level wages are depressed. Blumrosen feels that unless the Bennett Amendment is
interpreted to allow Title VII to go beyond the equal work standard, the Equal Pay Act remains a
shield protecting wage discrimination rather than becoming a sword used to fight against it.
Women's relatively low pay as compared with that of men is apparent from recent statistics
published by the Department of Labor. See note 5 supra.
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questions by basing its decision upon particular acts of Congress, its
analysis must make objective sense. The fact that contemporary wo-
men have inherited great economic and social burdens should not auto-
matically lead to interpreting statutory provisions, legislative history
and case law so as to conform to what the court believes should be the
proper solution to these problems. Although it is true that there are
important policy considerations in I UE v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp., it is also true that the court manipulated language and history to
reach a conclusion that does not withstand scrutiny. There may be
ways to combat historical sex-based wage discrimination, but constru-
ing the Bennett Amendment to say something it was never intended to
say should not be one of them.
Moreover, even if a comparable worth theory could be justified on
the basis of statutory construction, the acceptance of a comparable
worth'theory might create as many problems as it would alleviate. For
instance, it could cause great upheaval in the economy. It has been
estimated that if the aggregate pay for working women in the United
States was raised high enough so that the median pay for women would
equal that of men, $150 billion a year would need to be added to the
civilian payrolls. 152 Businesses would find it difficult to gauge prices,
since established wage rates would be askew while costs of material
would still reflect traditional market rates. 153 Employers might feel
compelled to cut labor costs through methods that could hurt employ-
ees. The Equal Pay Act prohibits reducing the wages of any employee
to comply with the equal pay provisions, 5 4 so employers could not try
this method of evasion. However, they could export work overseas, 55
thus legally paying lower rates and at the same time depriving many
workers of regular jobs.
Furthermore, if comparable worth did take hold and women were
paid more than they were previously, there might be little motivation
for them to leave clerical or assembly line jobs and break into non-
traditional employment. The result might be increased sex segregation
of employees as well as increased polarization of male and female soci-
etal roles. Unless women are motivated to move into new fields, the
152. See Brown, The "Comparable Work" Issue-A Tile VII Pandora's Box?, NAT'L L.J.,
July 28, 1980, at 27, col. 1.
153. Nelson, Opton, & Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the "Comparable Worth" Theory in
Perspective, 13 U. MIcH. J. L. REF. 233, 292 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as Nelson].
154. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
155. S. Chaikin, President of the ILGWU, AFL-CIO, Annual Convention, Washington, D.C.
(Nov. 15-20, 1979), blamed cheap overseas labor for women's low wages. BUsINEss WEEK, Dec.
17, 1979, at 69.
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goal of equal opportunity, which is the basis of the Civil Rights Act,
will not be achieved.
Another major problem of implementing comparable worth would
be the difficulty the courts would have in trying to determine what
makes one job comparable to another. 56 In Gunther v. County of
Washington ' 57 the Ninth Circuit pointed out that although going be-
yond the equal work standard would present "substantial barriers to
.. .establish[ing] a discriminatory compensation claim," the problems
of proof were "not sufficient reasons to foreclose the plaintiff from the
opportunity to establish [such a] claim."' 58  Nevertheless, those
problems should be acknowledged. Judges would be asked to make
decisions traditionally the province of businessmen and would be mea-
suring the worth of jobs without adequate guidelines. 59
A recent paper delivered on the issue of comparable worth 60
stated that comparable worth has very little substance or reliability.
According to Professor Cotton Mather Lindsay of the University of
California, it is incorrect to assume that "occupations similar in their
demands for knowledge and responsibility will pay equal wages in the
absence of discrimination."' 6' Professor Mather said that econometric
studies have demonstrated that "experience and education typically ex-
plain about one-third of the variance in earnings, even when the sam-
ple is restricted to white males .... "162 Confirmation of how difficult
it is to evaluate jobs was evident in the recent report of the National
Academy of Science to the EEOC. The Academy had been engaged by
the EEOC to construct a reliable job evaluation system. However, the
Academy concluded that much more study would be necessary before
such a system could be devised.' 63
The limitation of the Equal Pay Act on Title VII, the economic
pressures on employers and the difficulties in effectively comparing dis-
similar jobs make it unlikely that in the near future the work of most
156. See Christensen v. Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977); Lemons v. City of Denver, 620
F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980), for discussions of the kinds of burdens
courts are fearful of should comparable worth be recognized as a viable claim.
157. 623 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1979), af#'d, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623 (June 8, 1981).
158. Id. at 1314.
159. There is little evidence that differentials resulting from historical discrimination can be
quantified. See Nelson, supra note 153.
160. Equal Pay for Comparable Work: An Economic Analysis of Anti-discrimination Doc-
trine (a paper delivered at the University of Miami Law and Economics Center, 1980),partially
reprinted in FORTUNE, Apr. 21, 1980, at 42.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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women will be more highly valued or more highly compensated than
that of men. Despite this dim prospect, however, the continuing prob-
lem of underpaid women is not effectively addressed by court decisions
in favor of women if those decisions are poorly reasoned. The solution
must be based upon new legislation that clearly and definitively pro-
vides for what is not now available under either the Equal Pay Act or
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
CONCLUSION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that
the plaintiffs in I UE v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. stated a claim for
sex-based wage discrimination under Title VII even though there was
no allegation that they had been performing equal work. In so doing,
the court challenged past interpretations of the Bennett Amendment to
Title VII which said that the amendment engrafted all of the Equal Pay
Act onto Title VII, including the equal work standard.
Moved by policy considerations to give women more pay than
traditional female jobs had permitted them, the court interpreted am-
biguous words in the Bennett Amendment to mean that only the four
exceptions listed in the Equal Pay Act, and not the equal work standard
itself, were incorporated into Title VII.
It is understandable that the . U.E. court was moved to use the
anti-discrimination thrust of Title VII to attack the serious problem of
women's economic inequities. However, the court was neither objec-
tive nor thorough in its analysis of statutory provisions, legislative his-
tory, EEOC guidelines or case law. The court's verbal manipulations
do not conceal that Congress' intent in passing the Bennett Amend-
ment was to prevent violation of the equal work standard so carefully
defined in the Equal Pay Act.*
LILLIAN MILLER
* As this article was going to press, the United States Supreme Court decided County of
Washington v. Gunther, 49 U.S.L.W. 4623 (June 8, 1981), and by a 5-4 vote affirmed the 9th
Circuit's holding that female prison guards could bring a sex-based wage discrimination claim
under Title VII even though they had not met the "equal work" requirement of the Equal Pay
Act. The Court thus interpreted the Bennett Amendment as only incorporating into Title VII the
four defenses of the Equal Pay Act. Carefully stressing the narrowness of its decision, the Court
noted specifically that it was not deciding the issue of comparable worth. Instead, its decision was
apparently limited to the facts of the case, in which the plaintiffs had charged intentional sex-
based discrimination and in which an objective study of the worth and market value of the female
jobs at issue had indicated that females should have received more pay than they in fact did
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receive. The Court stated that the suit required neither judicial evaluation of male and female
jobs nor judicial quantification of the effect of sex discrimination on wages.
Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissent in which the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart and Powell
joined. They noted that the Court's opinion "is so narrowly written as to be virtually meaning-
less." 49 U.S.L.W. 4629 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices' more fundamental
objection to the Gunther decision was the quality of legal analysis it contained. They felt that "the
Court conveniently and persistently ignore[d] relevant legislative history and instead relie[d]
wholly on what it believes Congress should have enacted." Id.
Despite the Court's emphasis on the narrow scope of its holding, however, its reading of the
Bennett Amendment will undoubtedly make it easier in the future for women to claim equal pay.
Indeed, many more such Title VII claims can be expected because equal work standards no longer
have to be satisfied in intentional discrimination cases.

